Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency: How Glomar Responses Benefit Businesses and Provide an Epic Blow to Individuals by Chazen, Joshua R.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 8
Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National
Security Agency: How Glomar Responses Benefit
Businesses and Provide an Epic Blow to Individuals
Joshua R. Chazen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business and
Corporate Communications Commons, Communications Law Commons, Defense and Security
Studies Commons, First Amendment Commons, Internet Law Commons, National Security Law
Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the
Technology and Innovation Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joshua R. Chazen, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency: How Glomar Responses Benefit Businesses and Provide
an Epic Blow to Individuals, 9 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 315 (2014)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol9/iss2/8
Chazen PP1 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  1:26 PM 
 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 315 
 
Joshua R. Chazen* 
Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National 
Security Agency: How Glomar Responses Benefit 
Businesses and Provide an Epic Blow to Individuals  
In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency,1 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed 
the issuance of a Glomar response2 by the National Security Agency3 (“NSA”) in 
response to a Freedom of Information Act4 (“FOIA”) request submitted to the NSA 
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center5 (“EPIC”).6 The district court granted 
the NSA’s motion for summary judgment because an NSA affidavit supported the 
claim that the information sought by EPIC pertained to the NSA’s functions or 
activities.7 The information sought by EPIC was protected under Section 6 of the  
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 1. 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 2. A Glomar response is when an agency neither confirms nor denies the existence of records. Infra Part 
II.C. 
 3. For more information on the NSA, see http://www.nsa.gov/. 
 4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 5. “EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C., which was established in 1994 to focus 
public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and other 
Constitutional values.” Brief for Appellant at i, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5233). 
 6. Elec. Privacy Info Ctr., 678 F.3d at 929. 
 7. Id. at 930 (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 798 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31–32 (D.D.C. 
2011)). 
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National Security Agency Act of 19598 (“NSA Act”), which prohibits the release of 
information relating to the organization, function, or activities of the NSA.9 The 
issue before the D.C. Circuit was whether the material withheld by the NSA satisfied 
an exemption under FOIA.10 
The court held that the NSA’s Glomar response sufficiently satisfied the 
exemption requirements of the Act because threat assessment is an undisputed 
function of the NSA and, therefore, the NSA was not required to confirm or deny 
existence of any responsive records.11 Although the D.C. Circuit had a sound legal 
basis in making its ruling, the court’s holding should have been more narrowly 
tailored.12 While the court’s holding creates a positive effect on the ability of federal 
agencies and businesses to work together to handle cyber threats encountered in the 
private sector,13 it does not properly balance this relationship with the goals of FOIA 
and the public’s ability to trust businesses protecting its personal information.14 
I. THE CASE 
In January 2010, Google, Inc. (“Google”) was victim to a cyber attack15 directed at 
Gmail16 accounts belonging to Chinese human rights activists.17  Soon after the 
cyber attack, Google opted to change the privacy settings of Gmail so all incoming 
 
 8. Section 6 states: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this Act or any other law 
(including, but not limited to, the first section and section 2 of the NSA Act of August 28, 1935 
(5 U.S.C. 654) (repealed by Pub. L. 86-626, title I, Sec. 101, July 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 427)) shall be 
construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security 
Agency, or any information with respect to the NSA Activities thereof, or of the names, titles, 
salaries, or number of the persons employed by such agency.   
(b) The reporting requirements of section 1582 of title 10, United States Code, shall apply to 
positions established in the National Security Agency in the manner provided by section 4 of this 
Act. 
National Security Agency Act, P.L. No. 86-36, 73 Stat. 63, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note (2013). 
 9. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 930. 
 10. Id. at 931. See also infra Part II.A.2. 
 11. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 934–35. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. “A cyber attack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a 
political or national security purpose.” Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
817, 826 (2012). 
 16. For a brief description on the Google suite of products and services, including Gmail, see Michael 
Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory of “Contextual Integrity” to Clarify the Privacy Threats of 
Google’s Quest for the Perfect Search Engine, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109, 121–22 (2008).  
 17. Timothy Thomas, Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares”, PARAMETERS, Summer 2010, 101, 101. 
ChazenPP3.4EIC (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  1:26 PM 
 Joshua R. Chazen 
Vol. 9, No. 2 2014 317 
and outgoing traffic from its servers was automatically encrypted.18 Google notified 
other companies potentially affected by the cyber attack and stated it was working 
with U.S. authorities to determine the source of the attack.19 In February 2010, both 
the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post reported that Google contacted the 
NSA after the cyber attack.20 The Washington Post also reported, based on 
comments by former NSA director Mike McConnell, that the NSA’s collaboration 
with private companies was “inevitable.”21 EPIC submitted its FOIA request to the 
NSA on February 4, 2010, which requested: 
1. All records concerning an agreement or similar basis for collaboration, 
final or draft, between the NSA and Google regarding cyber security; 
2. All records of communication between NSA and Google concerning 
Gmail, including but not limited to Google’s decision to fail to routinely 
encrypt Gmail messages prior to January 13, 2010; and 
3. All records of communications regarding NSA’s role in Google’s decision 
regarding the failure to routinely deploy encryption for cloud-based 
computing service, such as Google Docs.22 
The NSA responded to the request on March 10, 2010,23 invoking Exemption 3 
of FOIA and Section 6 of the Act by issuing a Glomar response.24 The Glomar 
response meant that the NSA “neither confirmed nor denied the existence of any 
responsive records.”25 EPIC filed an administrative appeal, stating that the “NSA’s 
response was unlawful” because the NSA failed to issue factual support that the 
documents requested by EPIC fell within Section 6, which broadly prohibits the 
 
 18. Joe Wolverton, II, Is the NSA Using Google to Spy on Account Holders?, NEW AM. (May 18, 2012, 6:36 
AM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/11428-is-the-nsa-using-google-to-spy-on-
account-holders. 
 19. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html; see also Thomas, supra note 17, at 103 
(reporting that Adobe Systems, Rackspace Hosting, CyberSitter, Gipson Hoffman & Pancione, Juniper 
Networks, Northrop Grumman, Yahoo, and Dow Chemical were hit by the attackers). 
 20. Siobhan Gorman & Jessica Vascellaro, Google Working With NSA to Investigate Cyber Attack, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 4, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704041504575044920905689954.html; Ellen 
Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to Ward Off Attacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, at A01. 
 21. Mike McConnell, How to Win the Cyber-War We’re Losing, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html. 
 22. Brief for Appellant at 7, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 
11-5233). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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disclosure of information pertaining to the organization, function, or activities of 
the NSA.26 
Prior to the resolution of the administrative appeal, EPIC filed suit in the D.C. 
Circuit to challenge the NSA’s Glomar response.27 EPIC and the NSA both moved 
for summary judgment.28 The NSA’s motion for summary judgment included a 
declaration by NSA Deputy Associate Director for Policy and Records, Diane M. 
Janosek (“Janosek Declaration”).29 The district court granted the NSA’s motion for 
summary judgment because the Janosek Declaration was “logical and plausible” 
and had “sufficient detail, pursuant to Section 6, to support the NSA’s claim that 
the protected information” deals with the NSA’s organization, functions, or 
activities.30 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit attempted to determine whether the NSA‘s 
acknowledgement of the existence or nonexistence of the EPIC-requested material 
would reveal a function or activity of the NSA.31 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The issue in Elecronic Privacy Information Center was whether the NSA could issue a 
Glomar response in regard to EPIC’s FOIA request for records pertaining to the 
agency’s communications with Google.32 The interplay of the Freedom of 
Information Act,33 the National Security Agency Act of 1959,34 and the Glomar 
response35 was instrumental to the D.C. Circuit’s decision. 
A. The Freedom of Information Act 
1. Overview 
The major tenet of FOIA is that it gives the public access to government-held 
information.36 FOIA was the first law to give Americans a right to records of federal 
agencies.37 Under FOIA, a request can be made for any agency record.38 “[A]s the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 798 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Joint Appendix at 47, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 
11-5233). 
 30. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Elec. Privacy 
Info. Ctr., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32). 
 31. Id. at 931. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 
120 (1984). 
 37. History of the Freedom of Information Act, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/foia.html (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2014). 
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law that keeps citizens in the know about their government,”39 FOIA’s roots are 
embedded in traditional American principles of democracy, allowing access to 
information unless it is protected from public disclosure.40 Since its enactment in 
1966, the statute has undergone various changes.41 What has remained constant, 
however, are the nine exemptions that agencies often utilize when responding to 
FOIA requests.42 Since the Executive Branch oversees FOIA, each administration 
 
 38. What is FOIA?, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Karen Saunders, History of the Freedom of Information Act, DREXEL UNIV., http://www.cis.drexel.edu/ 
faculty/shelfer/public_html/busrefpapers/foiahis.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2014); see also History of FOIA, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-of-foia (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) 
(“Congress amended FOIA to become the bill that it is today” in 1974). 
 42. The nine exemptions apply to records that are: 
(1)  
(A)  specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in 
the interest of national defense or foreign policy and  
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2)  related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 
(3)  specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title [5 
USCS § 552b]), if that statute— 
(A)  
(i)  requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no 
discretion on the issue; or 
(ii)  establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld; and 
(B)  if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 [enacted Oct. 28, 
2009], specifically cites to this paragraph. 
(4)  trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged 
or confidential; 
(5)  inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; 
(6)  personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7)  records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that 
the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a 
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the 
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takes a different stance on how agencies should handle FOIA requests.43 FOIA 
applies to executive branch government agencies, which include the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Federal Election Commission, United 
States Postal Service, and Department of Defense (which has numerous agencies, 
including the NSA, under its umbrella).44 All agencies receive different numbers of 
FOIA requests; for example, the NSA received 1,809 FOIA requests during Fiscal 
Year 2012, as compared to 3,745 requests and 60 requests to the CIA and FEC, 
respectively.45 
The intent of Congress in adopting FOIA was to end the policy of withholding, 
rather than releasing, government-held information.46 Before FOIA was adopted, 
executive agencies were able to prevent information from being disclosed to the 
public due to lax policies under the Administrative Procedure Act.47 After FOIA was 
adopted, an agency receiving a FOIA request would: (1) release the requested 
records; (2) inform the individual that the requested records do not exist; or (3) 
determine that, even though the requested records exist, one of the exemptions 
applied and therefore the FOIA request cannot be granted.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any 
private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a 
record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a 
criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence 
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and 
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for 
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected 
to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or 
physical safety of any individual; 
(8)  contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on 
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial 
institutions; or 
(9)  geological or geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
 43. History of FOIA, supra note 41. 
 44. FOIA, http://www.foia.gov/data.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, 2d Sess. 2 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-813, 1st Sess. (1965) (stating the objective of 
FOIA is allowing for the fullest disclosure possible, so long as the disclosure is responsible). 
 47. See Jill Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act, MICH. BAR. J. 38 (Nov. 2006). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012). 
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2. Exemption 3 of FOIA 
Although agencies utilize all nine FOIA exemptions, the only exemption relevant to 
the case is Exemption 3 of FOIA.49 Exemption 3 protects information that other 
federal statutes require or permit to be withheld from release under FOIA by 
incorporating all federal nondisclosure statutes.50 As a result, FOIA incorporates the 
National Security Agency Act of 1959, which permits the NSA to withhold 
information pertaining to the functions or organization of the NSA as well as 
certain information pertaining to NSA employees.51 
One of the first cases to review the scope of Exemption 3 of FOIA was Gardels v. 
CIA,52 in which the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the CIA may say whether it had 
covert contacts at the University of California without damaging the confidentiality 
of its intelligence sources.53 The D.C. Circuit established that the applicable test is 
“whether on the whole record[,] the Agency’s judgment objectively survives the test 
of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility in this field of foreign 
intelligence in which the CIA is expert and given by Congress a special role.”54 The 
main takeaway from FOIA disputes is that a court will not argue with an agency’s 
decision to invoke an exemption so long as it is “logical” or “plausible.”55 
3. Official Acknowledgment Doctrine 
When challenging an agency’s decision to issue a Glomar response, plaintiffs often 
center their claims on a specific theory: if an agency disclosed information to the 
 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2012). Exemption 3, as amended, allows agencies to not disclose information if 
supported by a federal statute that, “(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 
particular types of matters to be withheld.” Id. 
 50. Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statutes Found to Qualify Under Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption3.pdf.  
 51. Id.; see also Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 868–69 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 52. 689 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 53. Id. at 1104. In representing its position, the CIA stated that admitting it had covert contact at UCLA or 
any other University of California campus would give foreign intelligence agencies the opportunity to identify 
exactly what the nature of those relationships were. Id. The D.C. Circuit was also concerned with the fact that 
“[t]he CIA has received more than 125 similar FOIA requests for information on covert contacts with American 
colleges and universities—covering about 100 different schools. If the Agency were required to indicate those 
schools with which it had had no covert contact, the work of foreign intelligence bodies would obviously be 
much easier; they could and would concentrate their efforts on the remaining American colleges and 
universities, and their sphere of activity could be appreciably narrowed.” Id. 
 54. Id. at 1105. Based on this test, as well as common law precedent, the D.C. Circuit accepted the CIA’s 
judgment because the CIA met the burden of proving that it maintained appropriate judgment in its decision 
that to divulge or acknowledge covert contacts with UCLA would disclose some foreign intelligence procedures. 
Id.; see also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he purpose of national security 
exemptions to the FOIA is to protect intelligence sources before they are compromised and harmed, not 
after. . . .”). 
 55. Larson, 565 F.3d at 862 (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); Gardels, 689 
F.2d. at 1105; Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
CHAZENPP3.4EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014  1:26 PM 
 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency 
322 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
public, then the agency cannot protect that information through a Glomar 
response.56 The D.C. Circuit has made clear that “when information has been 
‘officially acknowledged,’ its disclosure may be compelled even over an agency’s 
otherwise valid exemption claim.”57 
For the court to recognize that an agency officially acknowledged information, 
three criteria must be met.58 The three criteria are set as requirements “because they 
acknowledge the fact that in the arena of intelligence and foreign relations there can 
be a critical difference between official and unofficial disclosures.”59 For Glomar 
responses, if any prior disclosure establishes the existence or nonexistence of 
records responsive to a FOIA request, the prior disclosure will be regarded as an 
official acknowledgement.60 Official acknowledgment does not include mere public 
speculation, even if the media heavily reports the information.61 
B. National Security Agency Act of 1959 
1. Overview 
The NSA Act provides that the Secretary of Defense will appoint officers and 
employees of the NSA to ensure the functions of the NSA are carried out and 
outlines the powers and duties of the NSA director.62 The NSA Act initially did not 
describe the functions of the NSA, but dealt with other matters such as pay, 
training, acquisitions, and leasing.63 The NSA Act has been amended and its current 
version serves as the statutory basis for various NSA personnel policies.64 The NSA 
Act allows the NSA to serve as a vital safeguard in ensuring that America is 
protected.65 
 
 56. Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378 (appellant asserting that CIA waived its right to use FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 
because it officially acknowledged the existence of records in a congressional testimony nearly six decades 
prior). 
 57. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 58. Id. (citing Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (“First, the information 
requested must be as specific as the information previously released. Second, the information requested must 
match the information previously disclosed. . . . Third, . . . the information requested must already have been 
made through an official and documented disclosure.”). 
 59. Id. (citing Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 766 F.2d 604, 607–08 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Military 
Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 742–45 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillippi v. CIA, 655 F.2d 1325, 1332–33 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)).   
 60. Wolf, 473 F.3d at 379. 
 61. Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (supporting the rationale that the national 
media are not capable of waiving an agency’s statutory authority to protect information related to its functions 
and activities); see also Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130. 
 62. National Security Agency Act, P.L. No. 86-36, 73 Stat. 63 (1959). 
 63. RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30740, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 16 (2001). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 18. 
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2. Section 6 of the NSA Act 
No law shall be construed to require the disclosure of, inter alia, the functions or 
activities of NSA.66 Despite this general policy, the FOIA office at the NSA aims to 
release as much information as possible.67 However, the information being released 
cannot compromise the NSA’s goal of protecting classified and sensitive 
information.68 
The D.C. Circuit has addressed an NSA denial of a FOIA request after the NSA 
invoked the NSA Act and Exemption 3 of FOIA to move for dismissal of the 
proceeding or, alternatively, for summary judgment.69 Critical in the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis in Founding Church of Scientology was its belief that Section 6 of the NSA 
Act is an Exemption 3 statute.70 Section 6 states that: “nothing in this Act or any 
other law . . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any 
function of the National Security Agency, of any information with respect to the 
activities thereof, or of names, titles, salaries, or number of the persons employed by 
such agency.”71 The D.C. Circuit recognized that the congressional intent in 
implementing the NSA Act was to preserve national security.72 Thus, the D.C. 
Circuit interpreted Section 6 as a statute qualifying under Exemption 3, and, in 
certain situations, permits the NSA to withhold information.73 
At a later date, the D.C. Circuit addressed a question it left open in Founding 
Church of Scientology: what is the proper scope to give to the exemption under the 
Act?74 The D.C. Circuit answered this question by determining that the plain 
wording of the statute conclusively qualified the NSA Act as an Exemption 3 
statute.75 The D.C. Circuit held that, “where the function or activity is authorized by 
statute and not otherwise unlawful, NSA materials integrally related to that function 
or activity fall within [the Act] and Exemption 3.”76 The D.C. Circuit also held that 
 
 66. National Security Agency Act, P.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63 (1959). 
 67. See Freedom of Information Act Handbook, NSA/CSS, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/foia/foia_ 
handbook.shtml (last updated Aug. 23, 2013). 
 68. See id. 
 69. Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 827 (quoting Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 64 (1959)). 
 72. See id. at 826–27. 
 73. Id. at 828. Despite these findings, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision of the district court because it 
felt the district court could make a stronger effort to ensure that NSA implemented proper search procedures 
during the initial FOIA request. Id. at 837–38. In 2008–09, the Department of Defense used Exemption 3 to 
withhold information from FOIA requesters 35,835 times. Dept. of Defense FOIA Exemptions, PROPUBLICA, 
http://projects.propublica.org/foia-exemptions/agencies/16. Of these, the Department of Defense used Section 6 
of the NSA Act to withhold information from 1,681 claims. Id. 
 74. Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (The D.C. Circuit concluding that if the NSA released the documents requested by appellant, it 
would disclose a function of the NSA – the signals intelligence function). 
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in order to satisfy Exemption 3, an agency “must show specifically and clearly that 
the requested materials fall into the category of the exemption” in its affidavits.77 
C. Glomar Responses 
During the years immediately following President Johnson signing FOIA into law, 
agencies took one of three actions when responding to FOIA requests.78 However, 
beginning in the 1970s, agencies developed a fourth option when it came to 
responding to FOIA requests: the Glomar response.79 When agencies refuse to 
confirm or deny whether responsive records exist, this is known as a Glomar 
response.80 
Phillippi v. CIA established the Glomar response option.81 That case centered on a 
journalist’s FOIA request to the CIA regarding its relationship with the Hughes 
Glomar Explorer.82 In Phillippi, appellant, believing that the CIA persuaded 
members of the media not to publish information regarding the CIA’s alleged 
relationship with the Glomar Explorer, filed a FOIA request for all CIA records 
relating to contacts with the media.83 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit addressed only 
one issue: whether the CIA was required to support its response on the basis of the 
public record.84 The court determined that when the CIA claims it can neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of requested records, the only documents that the 
court can examine are affidavits submitted by the agency to explain its refusal to 
confirm or deny the records.85 
A Glomar response is appropriate when an agency believes that “to confirm or 
deny the existence of records . . . would cause harm cognizable under a[] FOIA 
exception.”86 The D.C. Circuit has held that the NSA can present a rational 
explanation for withholding documents and information under Section 6 of the 
NSA Act by submitting declarations from agency directors.87 So long as the NSA 
uses reasonable specificity and plausible logic to show that it appropriately withheld 
 
 77. Id. at 1390. 
 78. Supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reviewing the CIA’s decision to neither 
confirm nor deny U.S. Government activities in the interest of national security). 
 80. ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 81. OIP Guidance: Privacy “Glomarization”, FOIA Update, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter 1986), DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_VII_1/page3.htm. 
 82. Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1011.. The Hughes Glomar Explorer was a large vessel supposedly owned and 
operated by Summa Corporation. However, there were reports that expressed belief that the ship was actually 
owned and operated by the U.S. Government. For more on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, see Military Audit 
Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 728–29 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1012. 
 85. Id. at 1013. 
 86. Id. (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 87. See People for the Am. Way v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 462 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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the information, the D.C. Circuit has made clear that it will not overturn Glomar 
response determinations made by executive branch agencies.88 Federal agencies 
utilize Glomar responses because they believe that disclosing whether or not the 
agencies have records about a particular topic may, on its own, reveal protected 
information.89 This standard is difficult for plaintiffs to overcome because a Glomar 
response will be overruled only if the specific information requested through the 
FOIA claim was already in the public domain and officially disclosed by the 
agency.90 
The problem that litigants face when courts consider an agency’s motion for 
summary judgment as a result of the agency issuing a Glomar response is that 
litigants do not have the ability to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact because they have no way of obtaining records or information. When 
an agency, without using a Glomar response, denies an individual’s FOIA request, 
the individual, if he decides to protest the agency’s decision in court, has the ability 
to ask the judge to conduct in camera review91 or use Vaughn indices,92 both of 
which can help the individual make his argument for disclosure of the requested 
records. However, these two options are not available during appeals of Glomar 
responses.93 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Electronic Privacy Information Ctrenter v. National Security Agency, a three-judge 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
NSA.94 Judge Janice Rogers Brown, joined by Judge Brett Kavanaugh and Senior 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, held that cyber security threat assessments fall under the 
 
 88. Id. at 31; see also Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that “an agency 
may invoke the Glomar doctrine in response to a FOIA request regarding a publicly revealed matter. An agency 
only loses its ability to provide a Glomar response when the existence or nonexistence of the particular records 
covered by the Glomar response has been officially and publicly disclosed”).  
 89. See FOIA Basics, THE NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/guide.html 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (stating that Glomar responses are typically used if an agency wishes to not disclose 
the existence or non-existence of records because whether or not the records exist is, by itself, classifiable). 
 90. Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 91. “A judicial proceeding is said to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge in 
his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 760 
(6th ed. 1991). 
 92. A Vaughn index is a document that agencies prepare in FOIA litigation to justify each withholding of 
information under a FOIA exemption. The term stems from a D.C. Circuit decision that remanded a case so 
that the government could justify its assertion of exemption by indexing information so that it the decision to 
use an exemption was detailed, specific, and adequate. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 93. An in camera review cannot be utilized because there are no records eligible for review once an agency 
issues a Glomar response. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (implying that the 
creation of a Vaughn index is impossible because it requires the agency to acknowledge that records exist). 
 94. 678 F.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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NSA’s Information Assurance mission.95 Since the Information Assurance mission 
qualifies under Section 6 of the Act, and Section 6 of the Act qualifies under FOIA 
Exemption 3, FOIA requests that implicate the NSA’s Information Assurance 
mission can be answered by the NSA with a Glomar response.96 
The D.C. Circuit focused on the Janosek Declaration’s claim that one of the 
NSA’s missions is its Information Assurance mission, which gives the NSA 
authority to protect Government information systems.97 In meeting this mission, 
the NSA has the right to take action against any threats to U.S. Government 
information systems, even those that come from commercial technologies.98 The 
Janosek Declaration also stated that if the NSA unveiled whether there are records 
of communications between Google and the NSA regarding the cyber attack on 
Google, that admission could reveal whether the NSA undertook an investigation 
responding to the threat.99 
As a result of the Janosek Declaration, the D.C. Circuit concluded that any 
information pertaining to this specific relationship between Google and the NSA 
would disclose protected information about the NSA’s implementation of the 
Information Assurance mission.100 Critical in the D.C. Circuit’s decision was that a 
relationship or communication between the NSA and any private company would 
constitute an activity as outlined in Section 6 of the NSA Act.101 Therefore, if the 
NSA held any records regarding its interactions with Google, then this would be an 
NSA activity falling under NSA’s Information Assurance mission.102 
The most critical part of Judge Brown’s opinion is the determination that the 
NSA’s Information Assurance mission may be hindered if private entities believed 
their attempts to seek out the NSA’s assistance would be made public as a result of a 
FOIA request.103 The Janosek Declaration, which outlined NSA functions that would 
be implicated by disclosure, clearly defended the NSA’s reasons for answering 
EPIC’s FOIA request with a Glomar response.104 The D.C. Circuit held that a NSA 
function includes determining whether or not certain vulnerabilities in Google 
technologies pose a risk to the government’s information system.105 Moreover, a 
formed relationship between the NSA and Google is also a function of the NSA.106 
 
 95. Id. at 932. For more on the NSA’s Information Assurance mission, visit http://www.nsa.gov/ 
ia/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
 96. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 932. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 933. 
 106. Id. 
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The D.C. Circuit reasoned that even though the NSA released statements 
regarding its Information Assurance mission, it does not follow that the NSA 
waived protection under FOIA.107 In handling EPIC’s prior disclosure claim against 
the NSA, the D.C. Circuit determined that EPIC did not meet its burden of proof, 
requiring EPIC to cite evidence of information that is accessible in the public 
domain that is similar to the information being withheld by the NSA.108 EPIC fell 
short of the burden of proof requirement because EPIC’s FOIA request covered a 
substantially wider range of information than what was published on the NSA’s 
website.109 
The D.C. Circuit also rejected EPIC’s argument that the NSA be required to 
conduct a “search and segregability” analysis before issuing a Glomar response.110 
The court stated that when an agency claims it can neither confirm nor deny any 
existence of requested records, it makes it impossible for the court to review any 
documents other than affidavits explaining why the agency came to that decision.111 
EPIC stated that the D.C. Circuit upheld Glomar responses only when the agency 
performed a search and segregability analysis.112 However, the court rejected this 
statement as inaccurate, stating that the cited cases all involved the agency 
conducting a search and segregability analysis on its own accord before issuing the 
Glomar response.113 Further, in none of the cited cases did the court imply, let alone 
hold, that a search and segregability analysis by the agency was required.114 EPIC 
also attempted to argue that even when an agency issues a Glomar response, they 
are not exempt from performing a segregability analysis.115 The argument was 
rebuffed based on precedent.116 As a result of this precedent, the court concluded 
that forcing the NSA to conduct a search and segregability analysis would be 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 934. When an agency issues a Glomar response but fails to establish that all the records would be 
protected under a specific FOIA exemption, the agency must search through the records and segregate 
information that is not exempted from disclosure from the information that is exempted from disclosure. Id. 
(quoting Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Once the 
information is segregated, the agency must release the information that is not exempted. Id. (quoting Roth v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Here, the D.C. Circuit found the Janosek Declaration 
sufficiently supportive of the NSA’s Glomar response to allow the NSA to forego the search and segregability 
analysis. Id. 
 111. Id. (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 112. Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 25, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (No. 11-5233)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 24, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (No. 11-5233)). 
 116. Id. In support of this claim, EPIC cited Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007). However, Wolf 
expressly rejected this argument in a footnote. See Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374 n. 4. 
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meaningless and costly because the Janosek Declaration provided sufficient support 
for the Glomar response.117 
In affirming the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit held that the NSA responding to EPIC’s FOIA request 
might reveal the agency’s considerations regarding a particular cyber attack, or 
security settings of a private entity, was a potential risk to Government information 
systems.118 This type of “threat assessment,” or any ensuing decision or indecision, 
involves an uncontested NSA “function”––NSA’s Information Assurance mission––
and therefore satisfies Section 6 of the Act.119 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Elecronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the NSA’s Glomar response sufficiently satisfied the exemption 
requirements of the Act because threat assessment is an undisputed NSA function 
and, therefore, the NSA was not required to confirm or deny existence of any 
responsive records.120 In reaching this holding, the court correctly determined that if 
private companies knew their attempts to contact the NSA could be made public 
through a FOIA request, these companies might not contact the agency, thereby 
limiting NSA’s activities or functions.121 This decision not only puts federal agencies 
in a power position but also facilitates public-private partnerships in combating 
cyber threats.122 However, this decision negatively impacts the purpose of FOIA and 
the rights of individuals,123 and ultimately goes too far by ignoring the public’s 
interest in ensuring their information is under constant protection by companies.124 
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Paves the Way for Private Companies and the 
Government to Collaborate Freely, Without Fear that the Government Will Have to 
Reveal Information Regarding Breaches in Cyber Security Infrastructure 
The digital era produces massive amounts of information that can be stored and 
made readily available on the Internet.125 Much of this data includes personal and 
confidential information, collected and held for the benefit of a complex, search-
 
 117. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 934. 
 118. Id. at 934–35.  
 119. Id. at 935. 
 120. Id. at 934–35. 
 121. Id. at 932. 
 122. See infra IV.A. 
 123. See infra IV.B. 
 124. See infra IV.B. 
 125. See Jonathan Band, Google and Fair Use, 3 J. BUS & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2008) (stating that Google’s crown 
jewel is its search engine); see also Matthias Hild, The Google IPO, 3 J. BUS & TECH. L. 41, 41–43 (2008) 
(outlining a brief history of Google and its global impact). 
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friendly business world. However, this search-friendly world provides complexities 
from a business perspective.126 Perhaps one of the biggest problems businesses face 
in the twenty-first century is the constant threat of having their technological 
systems compromised.127 While this threat is not worrisome only for businesses 
across the globe,128 businesses have the most to lose as they compete for market 
share, investors, and revenue.129 If a company’s servers were compromised via a 
cyber attack, it could have devastating effects on its position in the market.130 
Cyber conflict is the new threat to national security, replacing traditional warfare 
as the method of attack on global infrastructure.131 With an increase in cyber threats, 
businesses are consistently facing more problems132 Google, as the world’s top web 
parent company133 and a Fortune 500 Company,134 is no exception.135 But Google is 
not alone in dealing with cyber security issues. 
For example, on December 19, 2013, Target Corporation, one of the largest 
retailers in the United States, reported that it suffered a security breach resulting in 
hackers gaining access to as many as 40 million credit and debit cards used by 
customers.136 Most unsettling perhaps in the eyes of the typical American consumer 
was the fact that the breach occurred during the height of the winter holiday season, 
where Americans spend over $500 billion buying gifts for family, friends, co-
 
 126. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J. BUS & TECH. L. 61, 84 (2008) 
(quoting Brian McNeill, UVA Professor Takes on ‘Googlization’, DAILY PROGRESS, Sept. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/article_36efefb6-74ca-5eb0-81db-e8afeb5b8064.html) (claiming that 
Google has managed to play a role in so many parts of the economy). 
 127. See Gary Loveland & Mark Lobel, Cybersecurity: The New Business Priority, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/view/issue-15/cybersecurity-business-priority.jhtml 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (less than half of all survey respondents identified their companies as having an 
effective information security strategy). 
 128. See, e.g., Hype and Fear, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
international/21567886-america-leading-way-developing-doctrines-cyber-warfare-other-countries-may 
(reporting that a senior official in the Department of Defense predicted that a cyber attack on America could 
potentially make the attacks on September 11, 2001 “look like a tea party”). 
 129. See Loveland & Lobel, supra note 127 (reporting that 41% of survey respondents faced one or more 
security incidents in 2011 and of those respondents, 37.5% saw their companies suffer financial losses as a 
result). 
 130. See id. (revealing that 31.2% of survey respondents who experienced a security incident in 2011 saw 
their company’s brand/reputation become compromised as a direct result of the attack). 
 131. Jason Ryan, FBI Director Says Cyberthreat Will Surpass Threat from Terrorists, ABC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2012, 
7:20 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/fbi-director-says-cyberthreat-will-surpass-threat- 
from-terrorists/. 
 132. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen Nakashima, Google Attack Part of Vast Campaign, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 14, 2010, at A01. 
 133. Top Tens & Trends, NIELSEN, http://nielsen.com/us/en/insights/top10s/internet.html (last visited Feb. 
27, 2014). 
 134. Fortune 500 2012, FORTUNE 500, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/full_list/ 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 135. Thomas, supra note 17, at 101. 
 136. Craig Timberg, Jia Lynn Yang, & Hayley Tsukayama, Huge Breach of Data Security at Target, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 20, 2013, at A01. 
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workers, and loved ones.137 The hackers, who gained access to Target shoppers’ 
names, credit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes, exposed major 
vulnerabilities in existing technologies.138 The negative impact of this attack carried 
over into 2014, where Target recorded a 52-week low in its stock price nearly every 
day between January 22nd through February 5th.139 Additionally, profits at Target 
during the fourth fiscal quarter of 2013 fell nearly 50% and declined by more than a 
third for all of 2013.140 
Using Target as an example of a company that did not seek the help of any 
federal agency following a security breach helps to show how the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision could give businesses confidence to confide in federal agencies, such as the 
NSA, when things go wrong. Businesses would be more willing to confide in federal 
agencies because agencies can just issue a Glomar response in the event that a FOIA 
request is made, so long as the reasons for invoking the exception are “logical” or 
“plausible.”141 Federal agencies, such as the NSA, are tasked with preventing attacks 
on American infrastructure;142 being able to assure private actors that 
communications between the agency and a business can be protected from the 
public eye is key in ensuring that this goal can be met. The fact that Google, perhaps 
the world’s largest innovator in how we share private information, was involved in 
this proceeding is particularly significant. If a major company like Google can be  
protected, there might be no limit on the types of businesses that will be assisted by 
NSA’s use of the Glomar response.143 
 
 137. See Holiday FAQ, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, https://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1140 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 138. Timberg et al., supra note 136. 
 139. Steven Russolillo, Target Takes Another Hit; Shares Drop to 52-Week Low, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 
3:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/01/21/target-takes-another-hit-shares-drop-to-52-week-low/. 
 140. Maggie McGrath, Target Profit Falls 46% on Credit Card Breach and the Hits Could Keep on Coming, 
FORBES (Feb. 26, 2014, 9:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/02/26/target-profit-falls-
46-on-credit-card-breach-and-says-the-hits-could-keep-on-coming/. 
 141. Larson v. Dept. of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 142. According to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “[t]he Information Assurance 
mission confronts the formidable challenge of preventing foreign adversaries from gaining access to sensitive or 
classified national security information. The Signals Intelligence mission collects, processes, and disseminates 
intelligence information from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and to support 
military operations. This Agency also enables Network Warfare operations to defeat terrorists and their 
organizations at home and abroad, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.”  
http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml. 
 143. This is particularly true in the wake of Edward Snowden’s reveal of the NSA’s massive communications 
collections. From 2010 to 2013, the number of FOIA requests filed with the NSA tripled. In this same time 
period, the denial rate increased from 33% to 82% as individuals sought their own records. Despite Edward 
Snowden’s reveal of the NSA’s information collection, it appears that NSA is playing close to the vest when it 
comes to revealing any sensitive information, which would provide greater protection for businesses. See Marisa 
Taylor & Jonathan S. Landay, Americans Find Swift Stonewall on Whether NSA Vacuumed Their Data, 
MCCLATCHYDC (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/02/11/217755/americans-find-swift-
stonewall.html. 
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For example, it was recently reported that the NSA was helping major national 
banks deal with cyber security issues.144 These problems stemmed from an onslaught 
of attacks on the financial institutions’ websites.145 It was reported that leading 
financial institutions, such as Bank of America, PNC Bank, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, 
HSBC, and SunTrust, were overcome by attacks on their servers and systems.146 But 
why, all of a sudden, are banks coming forward seeking help from NSA?147 
Mike McConnell,148 former director of the NSA, has long advocated for a 
relationship between the public sector and private businesses to better prepare 
American agencies for any and all cyber attacks.149 McConnell believes that by 
pooling together their resources, the NSA and large corporations like Google can 
defeat cyber terrorists from wreaking havoc on American technological processes.150 
McConnell suggested that, “For this to work, the private sector needs to be able to 
share network information—on a controlled basis—without inviting lawsuits from 
shareholders and others.”151 A relationship between the private sector and the 
Government that revolves around national security issues is ultimately a good thing 
because the goal would be to protect American citizens from future harm. However, 
agencies should be required to disclose what they are working on for the companies, 
particularly when the agencies receive FOIA requests. 
The D.C. Circuit’s holding furthers McConnell’s idea by allowing the NSA to 
issue Glomar responses in regards to EPIC’s request for information regarding NSA 
communications with Google.152 By justifying the NSA’s decision to issue Glomar 
responses, the court opens the door for businesses to begin communicating with 
NSA without fear that their problems will be exposed as a result of a FOIA 
request.153 This has huge benefits to businesses, which can use NSA resources 
without fear of private communications with government agencies becoming 
exposed.154 
Had the court come out in the opposite direction, private companies, as the D.C. 
Circuit analyzed, in the event of a cyber attack on its operations or servers, would be 
 
 144. Bea Edwards, The NSA and BofA: Working Together for Us?, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/44-2013/2468-the-nsa-and-bofa-working-together-for-us. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Ellen Nakashima, Banks Seek NSA Help with Computer System Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2013, at 
A03. 
 147. Id. 
 148. For more information on McConnell, who as of this writing is the Vice Chairman of Booz Allen 
Hamilton, see http://www.boozallen.com/about/leadership/executive-leadership/McConnell (last visited Mar. 
30, 2014). 
 149. See McConnell, supra note 21. 
 150. Id.   
 151. Id.  
 152. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 153. Nakashima, supra note 146. 
 154. But see Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court’s approval 
of the FBI’s Glomar response). 
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reluctant to work with federal agencies.155 If private companies are unwilling to 
report cyber attacks, it would likely limit the ability of federal agencies, such as the 
NSA or CIA, to determine the source of these cyber attacks, how to stop or contain 
them, and analyze the attacks so that they do not happen again. This decision firmly 
puts businesses in the driver seat and gives the government the means to pursue 
stronger methods of defense.156 The NSA can justify its actions based on its 
Information Assurance mission.157 
If the United States is going to be able to confront foreign and domestic 
terrorists engaging in cyber warfare, agencies must be able to assure businesses and 
their executives that by coming forward with information, there is no risk of 
potential exposure. Perhaps the only true way to make this a reality is for the D.C. 
Circuit to continue allowing the use of Glomar responses by federal agencies. 
B. By Categorizing Any Activity Between the NSA and a Private Business as Protected, 
the D.C. Circuit Undermined FOIA and the Public Trust 
The D.C. Circuit broadly concluded that records evidencing any interaction 
between Google and NSA would comprise an NSA “activity.”158 This proposition 
reduces the right of individuals to request any records held by a federal agency, a 
right they are entitled under FOIA.159 The decision dramatically inhibits President 
Obama’s goal of making federal agencies more transparent.160 In fact, the D.C. 
Circuit undermined President Obama’s presumption that, “[i]n the face of doubt, 
openness prevails.”161 
The issue remains: should any communication made by the NSA constitute an 
activity of the NSA? It is clear that allowing any communication with any private 
company is too broad of a standard, allowing federal agencies too much power in 
rejecting FOIA requests through the use of Glomar responses without the need to 
“make a specific showing of potential harm to national security in order to justify 
withholding information. . . .”162 Agencies already had strong protection as a result 
of the official acknowledgment doctrine.163 Since the NSA never officially 
 
 155. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 932. 
 156. Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon Expanding Cybersecurity Force to Protect Networks Against Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at A7. 
 157. Supra note 142. 
 158. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 932. 
 159. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 160. Freedom of Information Act: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 161. Id. But see History of FOIA, supra note 41 (stating that, “[i]n 2012, in a test of the Obama 
administration’s FOIA practices, 19 out of 20 agencies failed to respond in time to a FOIA request sent by 
Bloomberg News as they were required to by law”). 
 162. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 931. 
 163. Supra Part II.A.3. 
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acknowledged a collaborative relationship with Google, the official 
acknowledgment doctrine did not apply.164 The requirement that the specific 
information sought by the plaintiff must already be provided to the public by 
official disclosure is circular itself because the plaintiff would not need to request 
information that is already available.165 If the new battleground between nations is 
going to take place online rather than on the ground, then there should be some 
sort of dialogue between private and public sector leaders to discuss collaborative 
strategies without minimizing the rights of individuals under FOIA.166 
The fact that any communication between any private business and the NSA 
constitutes an activity of the agency is confusing. While the NSA made clear that its 
communications with Google should be protected because they would disclose a 
function of the agency and had a strong legal framework to support that claim, it 
does not appear rational to allow the NSA to have free reign to communicate with 
all private actors because it prevents companies from being accountable for not 
having best technological practices. The only true justification is the fact that an 
agency’s judgment to issue a Glomar response is given “substantial weight”167 and 
the D.C. Circuit did not find it necessary to overturn the NSA’s decision to issue a 
Glomar response in this scenario. Section 6 of the NSA Act was already regarded as 
broad enough to allow agencies to defend their withholding of records more 
easily.168 But this broad scope granted to Section 6 of the NSA Act allows 
government officials to consider information to be classified even when the public 
already knows about the information.169 
The NSA alleged that it would only enter into an agreement with Google if the 
NSA believed the cyber attack on Google posed a potential threat to government 
information systems.170 Given reports that the NSA is working with major financial 
institutions,171 it is more than likely that the NSA will take the same approach: 
issuing a Glomar response and stating that the NSA cannot confirm or deny 
communications with the banks because doing so would reveal the NSA’s thoughts 
on whether there is a security threat that concerns the United States Government.172 
 
 164. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 678 F.3d at 933 n. 5.   
 165. See Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 166. McConnell, supra note 21. 
 167. Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 840 (D.C Cir. 2001). 
 168. Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 
75 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 169. ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 170. Brief for Appellee at 21, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 
11-5233). 
 171. Nakashima, supra note 146. 
 172. Brief for Appellant at 21, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11-5233).. Although the D.C. Circuit weakens FOIA and prevents individuals and public-interest groups 
from gaining access to potentially important information, the Glomar response is ultimately necessary to 
protect state secrets from being revealed. This fact justifies the court’s decision in this case because national 
security breaches are perhaps the most important issue businesses and the government face in the digital era. 
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In the event that there is a FOIA request for records regarding the existence of a 
relationship between the NSA and the banks, it will be interesting to see how the 
D.C. Circuit would handle another Glomar response. If businesses that have a 
primary focus in technology (Google) and financial markets (banks) are both 
protected, then what individual interests will be left for FOIA to protect? As 
individuals and public-interest groups struggle to come to terms with the fact that 
Glomar responses prevent full disclosure by government agencies, it will be 
interesting to see how the government reacts to political pressures from pro-FOIA 
groups. Part of the solution can come from the Executive Branch, since each 
President of the United States has offered a different approach in regards to how 
much emphasis should be placed on FOIA.173 This might be the route to take 
because the D.C. Circuit’s Glomar response decisions indicate a preference for 
business over the individual. But for now it appears that the courts are willing to 
favor alleged matters of national security over individual access to information. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency,174 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NSA’s 
Glomar response, in regard to EPIC’s FOIA request regarding communications 
between NSA and Google, was valid under the broad ambit of Section 6 of the 
National Security Agency Act because any threat assessment conducted by NSA 
constitutes as an undisputed NSA function.175 The result is that the court protects 
business interests at the expense of individual rights regarding free access to 
information.176 This decision benefits businesses because they get to work with NSA 
in handling cyber security issues without the fear of potential backlash from the 
public as a result of information being turned over to individuals as a result of a 
FOIA request.177 Even though the decision was supported in a legal context, its 
decision to place national security concerns ahead of the right to access 
government-held information undermines FOIA and the ability for the public to 
know about the effects of cyber attacks on businesses.178 
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